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Article

Obligatory Health
Noa Ben-Ashert
The Supreme Court will soon rule on the constitutionalityof the Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act passed in March 2010. Courts thus far are divided on the
question whether Congress had authority under the Commerce Clause to impose
the Act's "IndividualMandate" to purchasehealth insurance. At this moment, the
public and legal debate can benefit from a clearer understandingof the underlying
rights claims. This Article offers two principal contributions. First, the Article
argues that, while the constitutional question technically turns on the
interpretationof congressional power under the Commerce Clause, underlying
these debates is a tension between liberty and equality. At a time when some
scholars are emphasizing the convergence of liberty and equality, the healthcare
debates accentuate the friction between these two foundational principles of
American jurisprudence. Second, this Article offers a supplement to the rightsbased orientation of both liberty and equality claims: the perspective of individual
obligation. The Article argues that a society committed to values such as equality
may sometimes need to achieve its goals through the recognition of individual
obligation. The Act embodies this insight. It is legislation that simultaneously
reflects social commitment to equality and the individual obligation of members of
society to help others realize their basic human needs.
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INTRODUCTION

Of course, I believe that every child has a right to decent education and shelter,food
and medical care . . .. I do believe and affirm the social contract that grounds those

rights. But more to the point I also believe that I am commanded - that we are
obligated- to realize those rights.
- Robert Cover'

Does every U.S. citizen have a right to affordable healthcare? If so, who
is responsible for the realization of that right? In enacting the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act ("PPACA" or "the Act") in March
2
2010, Congress seems to have answered "yes" to the first question. This
Article attempts to answer the second question by suggesting that
alongside the right of individuals to affordable healthcare, we might also
consider an obligation of individuals to ensure that all members of society
can realize that right. The Article argues that the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act embodies both the right and the obligation, and should
be viewed as responsible and ethical legislation.
The main legal question that has busied courts and scholars is the
constitutionality of Section 1501 of the Act, also known as the "Minimum
Essential Coverage Provision" or "the Individual Mandate." Section 1501
requires that every U.S. citizen (other than those falling within special
exceptions) maintain a monthly minimum level of health insurance
coverage beginning in 2014.3 Those who fail to comply will incur a penalty
included with the taxpayer's annual return. 4 To date, two circuit courts and
three district courts have upheld this provision, 5 one circuit court and two
district courts have invalidated it,6 and scholars are split on whether or not
it is constitutional and how the Supreme Court will eventually rule on this
question.7

1. Robert M. Cover, Obligation:A Jewish Jurisprudenceof the Social Order, 5 J.L. & RELIGION
65, 73-74 (1987).
2. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010),
amended by Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124
Stat. 1029 (2010). Key provisions of the Act will go into force in 2014.
3. "An applicable individual shall for each month beginning after 2013 ensure that the
individual, and any dependent of the individual who is an applicable individual, is covered
under minimum essential coverage for such month." Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act § 1501.
4. See id.
5. See Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 651 F.3d 529 (6th Cir. 2011); Virginia ex rel.
Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 656 F.3d 253 (4th Cir. 2011); Mead v. Holder, 766 F. Supp. 2d 16 (D.D.C.
2011); Liberty Univ., Inc. v. Geithner, 753 F. Supp. 2d 611 (W.D. Va. 2010); Thomas More Law
Ctr. v. Obama, 720 F. Supp. 2d 882 (E.D. Mich. 2010).
6. See Florida v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2011)
(affirming Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 780 F. Supp. 2d 1256
(N.D. Fla. 2011)); Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d 768 (E.D. Va. 2010)
(vacated by Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 656 F.3d 253 (4th Cir. 2011)).
7. See, e.g., Jack Balkin, The Constitutionality of the Individual Mandate for Health Insurance,
362 NEW ENG. J. MED. 482 (2010); Randy E. Barnett, Commandeering the People: Why the
Individual Health Care Mandate is Unconstitutional,5 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 581 (2010).
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This Article is composed of three main Parts. Part I introduces the
contrast between rights and obligations as core principles of two different

legal systems. In Obligations: A Jewish Jurisprudence of the Social Order, a
lesser-known Article published shortly before his death, Robert Cover
contrasts the American rights-based legal system with the Jewish
obligation-based legal system.8 Cover offers a fascinating account of the
founding myths of the two legal systems -Mount Sinai versus the Social
Contract-and argues that, for a full realization of human rights and
dignities, both myths are necessary. This Part examines these founding
myths in order to set the ground for a broader legal and political evaluation
of the Individual Mandate.
Part II shows that the Individual Mandate has so far been considered
primarily through the prism of rights. The intense legal and political
debates about the Individual Mandate have so far turned on a conflict
between two rights: liberty and equality. The Article demonstrates that
while the validity of the Individual Mandate formally turns on
Congressional power under the Commerce Clause, the underlying and
more meaningful conflict here is between these two competing rights.
Courts upholding the Individual Mandate have relied heavily on equalitybased rationales. By contrast, courts striking down the Individual Mandate
have promoted liberty-based rationales. Interestingly, whereas some recent
scholarship emphasizes the convergences between liberty and equality in
the jurisprudence of the Court, 9 the Individual Mandate debates accentuate
the tensions between these principles.
Part III proposes that the legal, political, and cultural understanding of
the Individual Mandate would greatly benefit from a perspective of
individual obligation. The Article argues that a comprehensive
consideration of the Individual Mandate should involve a theory of rights
alongside a theory of obligations. The idea that individuals in society may
have some obligation toward the healthcare of others may enrich the legal,
cultural, and political assessment of the Individual Mandate.

8. Cover, supra note 1. Writing in another context, William Eskridge has opined that "lain
understanding of citizenship that considers obligations as well as rights can also enrich our
understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . ." Eskridge considers how a theory of
obligations might apply to the jurisprudence of race, and the evolving jurisprudence of
sexuality, sex, and gender. William Eskridge, The Relationship Between Obligationsand Rights of
Citizens, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1721, 1722, 1727 (2001). For other interesting treatments, see
Suzanne Last Stone, In Pursuit of the Counter-Text: The Turn to the Jewish Legal Model in
Contemporary American Legal Theory, 106 HARV. L. REv. 813 (1993); Samuel J. Levine, Taking
Ethical Obligations Seriously: A Look At American Codes of Professional Responsibility Through a
PerspectiveofJewish Law and Ethics, 57 CATH. U.L. REv. 165 (2007).
9. See, e.g., Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747, 748-49 (2011)
("[Tihe Court has moved away from group-based equality claims under the guarantees of the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to individual liberty claims under the due process
guarantees of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. This move reflects what academic
commentary has long apprehended -that constitutional equality and liberty claims are often
intertwined."); Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The "Fundamental Right" that Dare Not
Speak Its Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1893, 1897-98 (2004); Rebecca L. Brown, Liberty, the New
Equality, 77 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1491, 1541 (2002).
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I. Two MYTHS OF ORIGINS
Just as the myth of social contract is essentially a myth of autonomy, so
the myth of Sinai is essentially a myth of heteronomy.
- Robert Cover10

"Every legal Culture has its fundamental words," writes Cover." The
fundamental word in the American legal system is "rights," and it is based
on the story of social contract.12 This myth assumes "free and independent
if highly vulnerable beings who voluntarily trade a portion of their
autonomy for a measure of collective security."13 The myth of social
contract makes the state the product of individual choice (and therefore
secondary to it). The individual metaphorically chooses the state by
choosing to enter the social contract. As Cover explains, "'Rights' are the
fundamental category because it is the normative category which most
nearly approximates that which is the source of the legitimacy of
everything else."1 4 Individuals, under this myth, "trade in" some of their
rights in exchange for collective security. The fundamental unit here is the
individual, and the possession of rights locates the individual "separate and
apart from every other individual."15
Not all theories that are founded upon rights are individualistic. As
Cover explains, "Collective solutions as well as individualistic ones are
possible, but it is the case that even the collective solutions are solutions
that arrive at their destination by way of a theory that derives the authority
of the collective from the individual." 6 Cover importantly reminds us that
even what we think of as egalitarian collective solutions are usually based
on theories of individual rights that extract the authority of the state from
the rights of the individual. In that sense, both egalitarian and libertarian
theories are children of the social contract story because they both trace the
authority of the community back to individual rights.
In Jewish law, the equivalent term to "right" is "mitzvah." The literal
interpretation of the word "mitzvah" is commandment, but in the Hebrew
language it generally means obligation.'7 The word "mitzvah" is also
"intrinsically bound up in a myth-the myth of Sinai."' 8 Sinai is an
experience of a collective, of all of the people of Israel who were led by
Moses out of Egypt. Together, as a group, they received the written law, the

10. Cover, supra note 1, at 66.
11. Id. at 65.
12. Id. at 66.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Cover, supra note 1, at 66.
17. In Hebrew the word duty (chova) corresponds to right (zchut) and has a different
meaning from the word mitzvah. The word chova (duty) does not carry with it a moral-ethicalreligious weight that the word mitzvah does.
18. Cover, supra note 1, at 66.
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Torah. According to rabbinical authorities, alongside the Torah, in Sinai the
"Oral Law" was given to Moses. 19
The myth of the social contract is one of autonomy whereas the myth of
Sinai is one of heteronomy.20 At the core of the myth of the social contract
stands the individual; and in the myth of Mount Sinai, the community.
Cover contrasts two key features of the myths: (1) the number of imagined
participants; and (2) choice or lack thereof.
First, Cover invites us to consider the imagined participants in these
two mythic lawmaking moments. It might seem silly to ask how many
people attended a mythical event. But this turns out to be one of the critical
aspects of both myths. What gives force to the Sinai myth is that all Jews
attended it. According to Jewish tradition, "[aill law was given at Sinai and
therefore all law is related back to the ultimate heteronomous event." 21
Thus all Jews are bound by mitzvot. It is a myth of a heteronomous event.
A key aspect of the myth of Mount Sinai is that all future generations
were present there, and are thus bound by obligation.22 Another way of
putting this is that the myth of Mount Sinai is not exactly a myth of a past
event. As Franz Rosenzweig writes, "for us too, above all the miracle of
Sinai, the gift of the Torah, and not even the Exodus from Egypt, signifies
the Revelation which accompanies us constantly as present."23 It is
interesting that the Exodus from slavery in Egypt, as Rosenzweig
emphasizes, must be remembered (in the holiday of Passover) but the
Torah and Mount Sinai do not need to be remembered; they are present. 24
Hence liberty must be taught and remembered, whereas obligation is
simply present.
By contrast, a shared community experience is not part of the social
contract myth. Yes, theoretically we could have all been there together. But
the myth does not turn on that -or even posit that. We might imagine
thousands of people calling out "I do" in an ancient stadium, but we could
just as well imagine a one-by-one march of individuals into the executive
boardroom to sign the Social Contract. The point is that the source of state
authority and the justification for obedience to law does not turn on how
many people attended the event of the social contract. In that sense, the
social contract is a myth about autonomy whereas Sinai is a myth about
heteronomy.
19. See MENACHEM ELON, JEWISH LAW: HISTORY, SOURCES, PRINCIPLES 192-94 (Bernard

Auerbach & Melvin J. Sykes trans., 1994). The Oral Law included all of the "subtleties of
Biblical exegesis, and the new interpretations of the soferim (scribes) and everything that the
soferim would later establish." Id.
20. Cover, supra note 1, at 66
21. Id.
22. JONATHAN SACKS, A LETTER IN THE SCROLL: UNDERSTANDING OUR JEWISH IDENTITY AND
EXPLORING THE LEGACY OF THE WORLD'S OLDEST RELIGION 14 (2004).

23. FRANZ ROSENZWEIG, THE STAR OF REDEMPTION, 387 (2005). The Christian analogy to the
constant presence of Mount Sinai, according to Rosenzweig, is the cross. Id. ("So for the
Christian it is not the manger, but the Cross that is always present; he holds the latter and not
the former before his eyes; as is said by us of the Torah, so could be said by him of the Cross, it
must be 'in his heart so that his steps do not slip.'").
24. Id.
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Second, Cover's distinction between the two myths also turns on an
idea of free choice. The gist of the social contract myth is that co-signers are
bound by state law because they freely chose to enter a contract wherein
each individual waived some rights. In that sense individuals who entered
(or would rationally enter) a social contract are bound by law based on a
theory of autonomy-a freedom to contract.25 In contrast, the myth of
Mount Sinai reflects no such choice. Moses told the people to come to the
mountain. They obeyed and received the Torah. 26
Cover characterizes the acceptance of the Torah in Mount Sinai as
"passive,"27 though we need not read it in this way. The radical acceptance
of the Torah, though very different from the signing of a contract, should
not be conflated with passive or childish obedience. In a famous and
puzzling passage in the book of Exodus, Moses reads to the people of Israel
what he had just heard from God. The crowd responds, "all that the Lord
has spoken we shall do and we shall hear."28 Interpreters of the text have long
wondered why the doing precedes the hearing. Would it not make more
sense for the Israelites to hear what the Lord has said before obeying?
What does it mean to say "we shall do" before "we shall hear"? Martin
Buber has attempted to resolve this paradox by interpreting the text: "we
shall do in order to understand." 29 But perhaps the reversal of reason and
deed should not be "resolved" or dismissed. Perhaps this reversal
illuminates the Mount Sinai experience. Emmanuel Levinas suggests that
reversing the doing and the hearing captures the uniqueness of the event of
Mount Sinai because it is an undertaking of an individual and communal
obligation that is not deducted from any reason or prior norm. 30
Mount Sinai and the Social Contract are two powerful and differently
structured myths of legal origins-of moments when it all began. In the
myth of Mount Sinai, a group of former slaves stands together at the heel of
a mountain in the desert and declare a commitment to a system of
obligation. In the myth of the Social Contract, a group of rational
individuals decides to form a society in which they will give away some of
their rights in exchange for security and other goods. These two myths do
not necessarily contradict each other, and each has in fact greatly influenced
the culture and law of liberal democracies. The Individual Mandate, as this
Article will explain, can be understood to reflect a unique and
25. JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CoNTRAcr 23-25 (G. D. H. Cole trans., 2008).
26. Exodus 19:10-19:17 (King James).
27. Cover, supra note 1, at 66 ("The experience at Sinai is not chosen...All law was given at
Sinai and therefore all law is related back to the ultimate heteronomous event in which we
were chosen-passive voice.").
28. Exodus 24:7 (my translation from Hebrew). The King James translation reads: "... and
they said, All that the Lord hath said will we do, and be obedient." Interestingly, the King
James version better fits Cover's characterization of passive voice.
29. See EMMANUEL LEVINAS, NINE TALMUDIC READINGS 42 (Annette Aronowicz trans.,
1990).
30. Id at 47-49 ("The Torah is given in the Light of a face. The epiphany of the other person
is ipso facto my responsibility toward him: seeing the other is already an obligation toward
him. A direct optics-without the mediation of any idea-can only be accomplished as
ethics.").
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commendable hybrid of the myths.
II. RIGHTS AND THE INDIVIDUAL MANDATE

Equality and social justice are the primary legislative goals behind the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. As evident from its title, the
Act seeks to protect current and future patients by making health insurance
affordable and available to all U.S. citizens. As of 2009, almost seventeen
percent of the non-elderly adult population did not have any form of health
insurance.31 The Act seeks to cure this problem. The "Minimum Essential
Coverage Provision" ("the Individual Mandate") requires that, beginning
in 2014, most U.S. citizens maintain monthly "minimum essential coverage"
for healthcare. 32 Congress determined that the Individual Mandate is
necessary because in its absence the Act might increase individual
incentives not to purchase health insurance until one needs care, and this
would significantly increase the price of healthcare.3 3 Thus, obliging each
individual to buy healthcare is necessary in order to establish a system that
provides access to healthcare for all its citizens. 34
But the Individual Mandate's promotion of equality and social justice is
not costless. For those who wish to be uninsured (the "willfully
uninsured"), the Individual Mandate is an imperative to purchase
insurance -a direct impingement on individual liberty. Thus, even before
its enactment, the Individual Mandate became a site of contestation: its
supporters have presented it as a necessary measure to promote equality

31. Carmen DeNavas-Walt et al., U.S. Census Bureau, Income, Poverty, and Health Insurance
Coveragein the United States: 2009, 22 (September 2010).
32. The Act imposes a penalty for failure to comply that is included with an individual's
tax return. Notably, the Individual Mandate does not apply to those who fall within a
specified exception. Philip Hamburger has pointed out that another serious constitutional
question that the statute creates is one of waivers. See Philip Hamburger, Are Health-care
Waivers
Unconstitutional?,
NATIONAL
REVIEW
ONLINE
(Feb.
8,
2011)
http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/259101/are-health-care-waivers-unconstitutionalphilip-hamburger. According to Hamburger, the waivers granted by the statute raise
"questions about whether we live under a government of laws. Congress can pass statutes that
apply to some businesses and not others, but once a law has passed-and therefore is
binding -how can the executive branch relieve some Americans of their obligation to obey it?"
Id. Hamburger concludes that "the current administration is claiming such a power to decide
that some people do not have to follow the law. This is dangerous, above the law, and
unauthorized by the Constitution." Id.
33. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, §§ 1501(a)(2)(I),
124 Stat. 119 (2010). Those incentives might be the result of the following other aspects of the
Act: the Act prohibits private insurance companies from denying coverage to those with preexisting medical conditions, and from setting eligibility rules based on medical factors or
claims experience, or from rescinding coverage other than for fraud or misrepresentation;
provides incentives for expanded group plans through employers; provides tax credits for
low-income individuals and families; and provides increased federal subsidies to state-run
programs. See id. §§ 1001, 1201, 1401-1402, 1421, 1513, 2001(a)(3)(B).
34. The Sixth Circuit in Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 651 F.3d 529 (6th Cir. 2011)
affirmed this equal access rationale by asserting that the minimum coverage provision is
necessary because it helps Congress lower the cost of health insurance premiums, and it
prevents exclusion from coverage based on pre-existing conditions.
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and social justice; and its opponents, as an illegitimate intrusion on liberty.
This tension between liberty and equality has been manifested in court
decisions and scholarly debates regarding whether Congress exceeded its
authority under the Commerce Clause when it enacted the Individual
Mandate.
A. The Liberty-Driven View
At the heart of current objections to the Individual Mandate is a claim
for liberty.35 Challengers of the Individual Mandate champion the liberty of
individuals not to enter unwilled transactions. This view is perhaps best
captured by Randy Barnett's critical characterization of the Individual
Mandate as an unconstitutional "commandeering of the people." 36 He
37
predicts that the Supreme Court will strike down the statute on this basis.
The theory of "commandeering the people" is based on a principle that
developed in the Court's jurisprudence in the 1990s. In New York v. United
States, the Court held that requiring states that refuse entry into agreements
to dispose of nuclear waste to become title holders of that waste constitutes
unconstitutional commandeering of state legislatures. 38 Justice O'Connor
explained that Congress does not have the constitutional authority "to
require the States to govern according to Congress' instructions." 39 This
would be an unconstitutional "commandeering" of states. 40 Next, in Printz
v. United States, the Court held that Congress exceeded its powers under the
Commerce Clause when it required that local sheriffs run background

35. Some have framed this legal discussion around the distinction between activity and
inactivity. See, e.g., Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d 768, 781 (E.D. Va.
2010) ("Every application of Commerce Clause power found to be constitutionally sound by
the Supreme Court involved some form of action, transaction, or deed placed in motion by an
individual or legal entity."); Barnett, supra note 7. However, most courts and scholars have
either dismissed the activity/inactivity distinction or rejected the characterization of not
purchasing health insurance as "inactivity." See Thomas More 652 F.3d at 547 ("the text of the
Commerce Clause does not acknowledge a constitutional distinction between activity and
inactivity, and neither does the Supreme Court. Furthermore, far from regulating inactivity,
the provision regulates active participation in the health care market."); Florida v. U.S. Dep't of
Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235, 1286 (11th Cir. 2011) ("we are not persuaded that the
formalistic dichotomy of activity and inactivity provides a workable or persuasive enough
answer in this case . . .. [tihe Court has never expressly held that activity is a precondition for
Congress's ability to regulate commerce. . ."); Mead v. Holder, 766 F. Supp. 2d 16, 37 (D.D.C.
2011) (characterizing the regulated behavior as a decision rather than inactivity); Liberty Univ.,
Inc. v. Geithner, 753 F. Supp. 2d 611, 633 (W.D. Va. 2010) ("The conduct regulated by the
individual coverage provision -individuals' decisions to forego purchasing health insurance
coverage - is economic in nature . . .
36. Barnett, supra note 7.
37. See id.
38. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
39. Id. at 162.
40. Id. at 176 ("the Act commandeers the legislative processes of the States by directly
compelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory program, an outcome that has never
been understood to lie within the authority conferred upon Congress by the Constitution.")
(citation omitted).
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checks on gun buyers.41 According to the Court, per Justice Scalia, the
requirement improperly commandeered state executive branch officials. 42
Although the principle of anti-commandeering has so far been applied
to states and not to individuals, Barnett argues that courts should forbid the
commandeering of individuals as well.43 The Individual Mandate
constitutes "the commandeering of the people as a means of regulating
interstate commerce." 44 By forcing citizens to enter into contracts with
private insurers, the Individual Mandate may have the undesired effect of
turning "citizens into subjects." 45 Through rhetoric of regression from
"citizens" to "subjects" Barnett marks what he views as a serious threat to
individual liberty. Citizens possess liberty. Subjects do not.
A similar view of individual liberty is also at the core of the Eleventh
Circuit's invalidation of the Individual Mandate in Florida v. U.S. Dep't of
Health and Human Services, currently before the Supreme Court. 46 The
Eleventh Circuit clarified that the ultimate goal of the constitutional
structure is "the protection of individual liberty." 4 7 Like Barnett, the court
framed the question raised by the Individual Mandate as "whether the
federal government can issue a mandate that Americans purchase and maintain
health insurance from a private company for the entirety of their lives."4 8
By characterizing the Individual Mandate as a "mandate to purchase" (as
opposed to a requirement to self-insure) the court revealed its libertyoriented view.
In a three-step analysis the court struck down the Individual Mandate.
The first two steps are primarily concerned with protecting the liberty
interests of the willfully uninsured; the third with state sovereignty. First,
the court underscored the unprecedented threat of the Individual Mandate
to individual liberty by announcing that "what the Court has never done is
interpret the Commerce Clause to allow Congress to dictate the financial
decisions of Americans through an economic mandate." 49 Mandating
purchases by individuals is a novelty that no Congress had attempted
before, and no court has validated before.50
41. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
42. Id. at 914.
43. Barnett, supra note 7, at 636 ("The minimalist character of this theory is likely to appeal
to Chief Justice Roberts, as well as Justices Kennedy, Alito and Scalia . . . extending its anticommandeering doctrine from the states to the people would be novel, but this is due entirely
to the novelty of the individual mandate itself.").
44. Id.
45. Id. at 637.
46. Florida v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2011), cert.
granted in part, 132 S. Ct. 604 (2011). See also Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 728 F. Supp.
2d 768 (E.D. Va. 2010) (vacated by Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 656 F.3d 253 (4th Cir.
2011)) ("Neither the Supreme Court nor any federal circuit court of appeals has extended
Commerce Clause powers to compel an individual to involuntarily enter the stream of
commerce by purchasing a commodity in the private market. In doing so, enactment of
[Section 1501] exceeds the Commerce Clause powers vested in Congress under Article I.").
47. U.S. Dep'tof Health & Human Seros. 648 F.3d at 1284.
48. Id. at 1287 (emphasis added).
49. Id. at 1288.
50. Id. at 1289 ("Even in the face of a Great Depression, a World War, a Cold War,
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Second, the court considered whether the Individual Mandate can be
legitimized by the substantial effects doctrine.51 The court concluded that it
cannot. 52 The Individual Mandate, according to the court, is simply too
expansive in scope,53 and its legitimation by the substantial effects doctrine
would mean that "the mere fact of an individual's existence substantially
affects interstate commerce, and therefore Congress may regulate them at
every point of their life." 54
Finally, the court raised the concern that healthcare is an area that is
traditionally a concern of states and not of the federal government. This,
combined with the other constitutional obstacles, led the court to conclude
that Congress exceeded its power by enacting the Individual Mandate.55
The court declared that "what Congress cannot do under the Commerce
Clause is mandate that individuals enter into contracts with private
insurance companies for the purchase of an expensive product from the
time they are born until the time they die." 56
B. The Equality-Driven View
In contrast with the liberty-driven view that underscores the Individual
Mandate's cost to individual liberty, the equality-driven view elaborates its
potential benefits to equality and social justice. The Individual Mandate is
understood as a necessary component of an Act "designed to improve
access to the healthcare and health insurance markets, reduce the escalating
costs of healthcare, and minimize cost-shifting." 57 Although equality and

recessions, oil shocks, inflation, and unemployment, Congress never sought to require the
purchase of wheat or war bonds, force a higher savings rate or greater consumption of
American goods, or require every American to purchase a more fuel efficient vehicle.").
51. Id. at 1292. The Supreme Court has developed a three-pronged test to determine
whether a federal statute falls within Congress's authority under the Commerce Clause. U.S. v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558-59 (1995). First, Congress can regulate "the use of the channels of
interstate commerce." Id. at 558. Second, Congress can protect "the instrumentalities of
interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce." Id. Third, Congress can
regulate "those activities having a substantial relation to interstate commerce." Id. at 558-59.
The discussion of the Individual Mandate turns on whether it falls under the third category,
known as the substantial effects doctrine.
52. U.S. Dep'tofHealth & Human Servs. 648 F.3d at 1292.
53. The court dismissed the application of the aggregation doctrine, which authorizes
Congress "to apply an otherwise valid regulation to a class of intrastate activity it might not be
able to reach in isolation ... [since] any person's decision not to purchase a good would, when
aggregated, substantially affect interstate commerce in that good." Id. In rejecting the
application of this doctrine the court noted that "[a]lthough any decision not to purchase a
good or service entails commercial consequences, this does not warrant the facile conclusion
that Congress may therefore regulate these decisions pursuant to the Commerce Clause." Id. at
1292-93.
54. Id. at 1295 ("This theory affords no limiting principles in which to confine Congress's
enumerated power.").
55. Id. at 1305.
56. Id. at 1311. In addition, the court held that that the Individual Mandate is a civil
penalty and not a tax, and as such, it must be justified in a different enumerated power than
the power to tax. Id. at 1314.
57. Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 651 F.3d 529, 532 (6th Cir. 2011).
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social justice are not always explicitly mentioned by courts and scholars
who support the Individual Mandate, they are its underlying rationales. If
one were to interrogate why Congress seeks to improve access to healthcare
at the national level and reduce its escalating costs, the answer would most
likely involve some version of the aspiration that participants in a liberaldemocracy have access basic health coverage. This aspiration is based in
equality.58
The Individual Mandate attempts to solve an acute phenomenon of
social injustice. As mentioned above, as of 2009, almost seventeen percent
of the non-elderly adult population does not have any form of health
insurance.59 The Individual Mandate requires that everyone participate in
the health insurance markets so the entire population can afford coverage.60
According to Congressional findings, the Individual Mandate and the other
provisions of the Act will "add millions of new consumers to the health
insurance market, increasing the supply of, and demand for, health care
services." 61 This should result in the desired goal of "near-universal
coverage by building upon and strengthening the private employer based
system, which covers 176,000,000 Americans
health insurance
nationwide." 62 Thus President Obama declared at the signing of the bill that
this is the type of social reform that "generations of Americans have fought
for and marched for and hungered to see." 63
These goals of equality and social justice have been validated by the
courts that have so far upheld the Individual Mandate. For example, in
Thomas More v. Obama,64 the Sixth Circuit, in upholding the Act under the
Commerce Clause, praised the two key policy goals embodied by the

58. Notably, the justification for the Act could also be grounded in a broader set of ideas
about democracy or in positive liberty (as opposed to negative). See, e.g., Isaiah Berlin, Two
Concepts of Liberty in FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY (1969). The term "equality" is used in this Article
as a short-hand for these types of approaches to social justice. I thank Andrew Lund for
discussing this point with me.
59. U.S. Census Bureau, supra note 31, at 22.
60. 42 U.S.C. § 18091 (2006). See also Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010), amended by Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of
2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, § 1501, 124 Stat. 1029 (2010).
61. 42 U.S.C. § 18091 (2006).
62. Id. See also Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, §1557(a) ("Except as otherwise
provided for in this title (or an amendment made by this title), an individual shall not, on the
ground prohibited under title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000d et seq.), title
IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 (20 U.S.C. 1681 et seq.), the Age Discrimination Act
of 1975 (42 U.S.C. 6101 et seq.), or section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. 794),
be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination
under, any health program or activity, any part of which is receiving Federal financial
assistance, including credits, subsidies, or contracts of insurance, or under any program or
activity that is administered by an Executive Agency or any entity established under this title
(or amendments). The enforcement mechanisms provided for and available under such title
VI, title IX, section 504, or such Age Discrimination Act shall apply for purposes of violations
of this subsection.").
63. Sheryl Gray Stolberg & Robert Pear, Obama Signs Health Care Overhaul Bill, With a
Flourish, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 2010, at A19.
64. 651 F.3d 529 (6th Cir. 2011).
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Individual Mandate: (1) lowering health insurance premiums; 65 and (2)
preventing exclusion from coverage of patients based on pre-existing
conditions. 66 The court recited the legislative intent behind the Individual
Mandate: it is "an essential cog" in a scheme to "reform the national
markets in health care delivery and health insurance." 67 The court agreed
with the government that the activity of the uninsured substantially affects
interstate commerce, 68 and that the Individual Mandate is constitutional
because it aims to make healthcare attainable for the entire population. 69
C. Equality v. Liberty
Although the equality-based view and the liberty-based view reach
different conclusions about the main legal question-the constitutional
validity of the Individual Mandate-both approaches reflect deep
commitments to theories of individual rights. The liberty-based view
challenges the Individual Mandate primarily because it impinges on
individual liberty by requiring individuals to purchase health insurance
policies. The equality-based view embraces the Individual Mandate
primarily because it seeks to rectify acute and discriminatory inequities in
individual access to healthcare.
The Supreme Court will soon decide whether the Individual Mandate
is constitutional. How will the Court balance the equality arguments of one
side with the liberty arguments of the other? In recent years scholars have
traced a convergence of the right to liberty and the right to equality in the
Court's jurisprudence. Kenji Yoshino, for example, has recently argued that
the Supreme Court has shifted from its traditional equal protection
jurisprudence to a "liberty-based dignity jurisprudence."70 According to
Yoshino, this approach "synthesizes both equality and liberty claims, but
leads with the latter to quiet pluralism anxiety in an increasingly diverse

65. Id. at 535 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 18091(2)(F)).

66. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 18091(2)(I)).
67. Id. at 534.
68. Id. at 544 ("Congress had a rational basis to believe that the practice of self-insuring for
the cost of health care, in the aggregate, substantially affects interstate commerce. An
estimated 18.8% of the non-elderly United States population (about 50 million people) had no
form of health insurance for 2009. Virtually everyone requires health care services at some
point, and unlike nearly all other industries, the health care market is governed by federal and
state laws requiring institutions to provide services regardless of a patient's ability to pay. The
uninsured cannot avoid the need for health care, and they consume over $100 billion in health
care services annually.") (citations omitted).
69. Similarly, in Liberty University, a Virginia district court viewed the Individual Mandate
as essential, primarily because leaving the willfully uninsured unregulated would drive up
prices of insurance policies and shift the costs of healthcare to other market participants.
Liberty Univ., Inc. v. Geithner, 753 F. Supp. 2d 611, 634 (W.D. Va. 2010) ("[W]ithout it,
individuals would postpone health insurance until they need substantial care, at which point
the Act would obligate insurers to cover them at the same cost as everyone else."). The court
also rejected the plaintiffs' contention that the penalty provisions of the Act are
unconstitutional capitation or direct taxes. Id. at 648.
70. Yoshino, supra note 9, at 799.
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society."7 1
Under what has been called the "new equal protection" framework, the
Court is understood to prefer rights claims grounded in liberty over those
grounded in equality. If the Court in the healthcare context follows this
preference, we may see a surprising articulation of a right to health under a
theory of liberty. 72 But regardless of how the Court frames a right to health,
it is important to see that unlike cases such as Lawrence v. Texas73 or Perry v.
Schwarzenegger74 - in which there is no real tension between liberty and
equality for the protected groups-in the healthcare debates there is a
strong tension between the liberty and equality arguments. In fact, at least
some versions of equality and liberty are irreconcilable here, and the Court
will have to choose one over the other. And while the right to health could
also be framed as a "liberty-based dignity claim," this right would
inevitably compete with another liberty - the liberty not to be coerced into
forming a contract. Interestingly, in light of the claims of a "new equal
protection" or "legal double helix," 75 the Court might have to end up
balancing two different liberty claims: liberty from coerced contracting and
liberty to have healthcare. 76
In sum, the primary legal issue triggered by the Individual Mandate, its
constitutionality under the Commerce Clause, has elicited two strands of
rights-based rationales: one based in liberty, the other in equality. Under
the former, the Individual Mandate is an unconstitutional imperative to
enter involuntary contracts with private insurers; under the latter, it is a
constitutional, equality-driven regulation of irresponsible participants in
healthcare markets. The leading value under the former view is liberty from
contracts; and under the latter view, equal access to healthcare. The
Supreme Court will soon resolve the conflict between liberty and equality
in the context of the Individual Mandate. The next Part argues that in
moving towards this resolution, the legal and cultural conversation about
individual rights would be enhanced by a notion of individual obligation.

III.

INTEGRATING A THEORY OF OBLIGATION

Debates about the Individual Mandate, as we have seen, reflect
competing approaches to individual rights. But the understanding of this
legislation is incomplete without a notion of individual obligation. The

71. Id. at 802.
72. Yoshino's theory seems to support this prediction both on a descriptive and a
normative level. Id. at 794 ("As the polity becomes more diverse, such 'rights talk' can be a
ground on which to create coalitions that embody broader, more inclusive forms of 'we.' For
instance, movements for a 'right to education,' a 'right to health care,' a 'right to welfare,' or a
'right to vote' that cut across traditional identity politics groups might helpfully erode the
traditional group-based distinctions among them.").
73. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
74. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
75. Tribe, supra note 9, at 1897-98.
76. See supra note 58.
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Individual Mandate places an explicit obligation on individuals to participate
in a plan that strives to guarantee healthcare for all. Unlike some welfare
states that provide direct state funding of health for all citizens,77 the
Individual Mandate places at least some of this funding burden on
individuals. In doing so, the Individual Mandate seems to recognize an
individual right to health at the same time that it declares an individual
obligation to contribute to the health of others.
The dominant tradition of liberal rights in the United States has long
existed in tension with a tradition of obligations. This tension, as William
Eskridge has pointed out, was already apparent in nineteenth-century
political philosopher Francis Lieber's Manual of PoliticalEthics, where Lieber
observed that a polity where men "claim, maintain, or establish rights"
cannot be a lawful or ordered society "without acknowledging
corresponding and parallel obligations."7 8
The notion of individual obligation offers another perspective in the
evaluation of the Individual Mandate. As we saw in Part I, Cover traces the
current rights-based U.S. constitutional jurisprudence to the myth of the
social contract. He counters this with an obligation-based Jewish
jurisprudence that can be traced to the myth of Mount Sinai. Cover's text
does not advocate replacing a theory of rights with a theory of obligations.
Instead, he seeks to complement rights with obligations, explaining that to
achieve greater human rights and dignities, "[tihere is no question that we
can use as many good myths ... as we can find." 79
A. Individual Obligation
Obligation is the principal word in Jewish legal culture. One of the
unique aspects of Jewish Law is that although it combines rules that are
purely religious (such as fasting on Yom Kippur) with rules that are purely
legal (such as business, labor, and tort rules) its entirety is born out of
religious obligation.8 o Namely, the obligation to fast on Yom Kippur and the
obligation to deal in good faith come from the same source: religious
obligation. Jewish Law has existed for more than three thousand years

77. Vassilis Hatzopoulos, Financing National Health Care in a TransnationalEnvironment: The
Impact of the European Community Internal Market, 26 Wis. INT'L L.J. 761, 767-69 (2008) (listing
European states, including the United Kingdom, Ireland, Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Spain,
Portugal, Italy, and Greece).
78. Eskridge, supra note 8, at 1722-23 (quoting Francis Lieber, MANUAL OF POLITICAL
ETICS 383-411 (Theodore D. Woolsey ed., 2d ed. rev. 1911) (1838)). Lieber further writes: "It is
natural, therefore, that wherever there exists a greater knowledge of right, or a more intense
attention to it, than to concurrent and proportionate obligation, evil ensues. . . The very
condition of right is obligation; the only reasonableness of obligations consists in rights. Since,
therefore, a greater degree of civil liberty implies the enjoyment of more extended
acknowledged rights, man's obligations increase with man's liberty. Let us, then, call that
freedom of action which is determined and limited by the acknowledgment of obligation,
Liberty; freedom of action without limitation by obligation, Licentiousness. The greater the
liberty, the more the duty."). Id. at 1723.
79. Cover, supra note 1, at 73.
80. ELON, supra note 19, at 4-5
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during most of which Jews enjoyed no state or political independence.81
However, the lack of political independence and the exile from the
homeland, as Menachem Elon writes, "did not result in the abrogation of
judicial autonomy."82 In fact, the Jewish legal system not only survived,
"but its most vigorous development occurred when the people were widely
scattered throughout the diaspora."83 For most of these years, the leaders of
the Jewish communities successfully negotiated for relative legal
independence within the countries in which they resided. 84 The legal rules
that flourished reflected the obligations and responsibilities of a community
with a separate social, economic, and essentially Jewish public life, in which
only a few formal legal sanctions were actually available. 85 Consequently,
an obligation-based legal system flourished.
As Cover argues, a system of obligation is equipped to overcome some
of the problems that may arise in a system of rights. In particular, "the
jurisprudence of rights has proved singularly weak in providing for the
material guarantees of life and dignity flowing from the community to the
individual."8 6 The point is not that rights cannot theoretically achieve the
full guarantees of life and dignity, but that American rights jurisprudence,
in its primary focus on negative rights and on non-interference, has proved
weak in doing so. "While we may talk of the right to medical care, the right
to subsistence, the right to an education," writes Cover, "we are constantly
met by the realization that such rhetorical tropes are empty in a way that
the right to freedom of expression or the right to due process are not."8 7
Cover draws a distinction here between two types of rights: those that have
been successfully realized in U.S. constitutional jurisprudence (free speech,
due process), and those that have not (health, education).
There is a difference between restraining state power and granting
rights to education or health. In restraining state power, "the intelligibility
of the principle remains because it is always clear who is being addressed whoever it is that acts to threaten the right in question."88 If the state takes
something from you, such as property, speech, or the right to make private
intimate decisions, then the state is the addressee of the rights claim. One
makes a claim against the state to recover for whatever the state has
wrongfully taken or prohibited. But a right to health or education is "not
even an intelligible principle unless we know to whom it is addressed." 89 In
other words, the state can recognize or declare general rights to health or

81. Id. at 1.
82. Id. at 2.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 7-8. Thus religious Jewish law applied to private law (property, acquisitions,
obligations, family matters, succession), as well as to some aspects of public law. Id. at 10.
85. See id. at 11. See also Neil W. Netanel & David Nimmer, Is Copyright Property? The
Debate in Jewish Law, 12 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN L. 217, 241 (2011) (describing the use of
excommunication as a sanction for those who violated an exclusive printing privilege).
86. Cover, supra note 1, at 71.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
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education (such as "no child left behind"90 ), but unless it is clear who will
pay for it, the declared right will be mostly rhetorical. 91 This is so because,
even when something like a right to education is recognized, "a
distributional premise is missing which can only be supplied through a
principle of 'obligation.'" 92
93
No such problem exists under the Jewish legal system of obligations.
For example, an important principle in Jewish law is the guarantee of
education -but this is achieved through a regime of obligations rather than
a regime of rights. "[I]t is striking," writes Cover, "that the Jewish legal
materials never speak of the right or entitlement of the child to an
education." 94 Instead, "they speak of the obligation incumbent upon
various providers to make the education available." 95 Instead of declaring a
right to education, the Jewish legal system allocates the relevant
responsibilities:
It is a mitzvah for a father to educate his son, or
grandson. It is a mitzvah for a teacher under certain
circumstances to teach even without remuneration. It is a
mitzvah for the community to make certain provision for
education and its institutions. It is a mitzvah for
householders to board poor scholars and support them,
etc.96
The difference between the right to education (a nominalization that
emphasizes the recipient) and the obligation to educate (an active verb that
allocates responsibility) is that the right to education might be empty of
there is no
content if there is no clear allocation of responsibility -if
pointing finger as to who is obligated to realize the right. In a jurisprudence
of obligations, "the loaded, evocative edge is at the assignment of
responsibility. It is to the parent paying tuition, the householder paying his
assessment that the law speaks eloquently and persuasively." 97 In a similar
way, through its specific and direct assignment of individual responsibility,
the Individual Mandate fills with content what would have otherwise been
an empty right.
90. No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (codified in
scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.)
91. Cover gives as examples campaigns for the rights of children or people with mental
disability, which gravitate to the rhetoric of rights, but he argues that "the evocative force of
the rights rhetoric having done its work, we leave to the technicians the allocation of fiscal
responsibility." Cover, supra note 1, at 72.
92. Id. at 71.
93. There are, however, areas that Jewish law has serious problems with, especially in the
realm of equal participation. Id.; see also Stone, supra note 8, at 814 (arguing that "the countermodel presented so far is often more wishful than accurate and, even when accurate, has
limited applicability in a secular legal society").
94. Cover, supra note 1, at 71.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 72.
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Assigning responsibility to individuals by way of obligation (as in the
Individual Mandate) is different from assigning the duty directly to the
government. In the realm of jurisprudence and political science, arguments
for the right to health often assign the primary responsibility to the
government. These discussions turn on equality, social justice, and positive
liberties.98 In the distinction between negative liberty and positive liberty,
negative liberty generally refers to freedom from government intrusion,
whereas positive liberty refers to affirmative government action that
facilitates an individual's pursuit of freedom. 99 Some have argued that
liberal democracies have a duty-and individuals have a corresponding
right -not only to be free of state intrusion, but also to receive meaningful
medical care, education, and the satisfaction of other basic human needs. 0 0
As Isaiah Berlin has emphasized, without a comprehensive theory of
positive liberties, negative liberties might be meaningless for many.' 0'
Such theories of governmental duties towards citizens complement but
nonetheless differ from Cover's theory of obligation. An individual who
seeks to enjoy a positive liberty typically makes a claim on the state. But in
a theory of obligation there is a community obligation to act regardless of
whether a specific individual or a group of individuals has initiated a legal
claim. The focus here is on the responsibility of the community rather than
on the right of the recipient.
Cover's example of the dress of litigants before a tribunal is
illuminating on this point. In Estelle v. Williams,102 the Supreme Court held
that a defendant has the right to appear in civilian clothes during the trial,
and that he does not have to appear dressed in a convict garb. However, the
Court also ruled that in the absence of timely objection, the right to wear
civilian clothes was waived.10' In contrast, under a system of obligation in
Jewish law, there is a positive commandment that "enjoins upon the judge
the duty to judge righteously"-and therefore if one party to a suit is
dressed well, and the other is not, the judge has to say to the well dressed
party, "either dress him like yourself before the trial is held or dress like

98. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE: THE -THEORY AND PRACTICE OF
EQUALITY (2002); MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY,
AND OTHER TWENTIETH-CENTURY TRAGEDIES (1995); Robin West, UnenumeratedDuties, 9 U. PA.

J. CONST. L. 221 (2006).
99. For an early distinction between negative and positive liberty, see generally Berlin,
supra note 58. Many different accounts of both positive and negative liberty have been
proposed since Berlin's essay was first published in 1969. See generally Charles Taylor, What's
Wrong with Negative Liberty, in THE IDEA OF FREEDOM: ESSAYS INHONOUR OF ISAIAH BERLIN 175
(Alan Ryan ed., 1979) (arguing that decisions and actions which result from certain
uncontrolled motivations are not really free). In addition, the meaning of "coercion" within the
definition of negative liberty is itself open to various interpretations. See, e.g., ROBERT NOZICK,
SOCRATIC PUZZLES 15-45 (1997); JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 148-57 (1986)
(discussing the various ways in which coercion interferes with human autonomy).
100. See supra note 99.
101. See Berlin, supra note 58.
102. 425 U.S. 501 (1976).
103. See id. at 512-13.
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him, then the trial will take place."1 04
The distinction between the right of the defendant to wear civilian
clothes in Estelle and the obligation of the judge to make sure a litigant is
properly dressed is not mere semantics. By assigning responsibility to the
judge, the legal system makes the realization of the social value at stake
more likely. This is precisely what the Individual Mandate does: it does not
merely declare a right to medical care. It also points a finger at the
responsible agents to realize this right: the citizens of the United States.
B. The Obligatory Individual Mandate
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act established an
individual right to healthcare. This legislation reflects Congress's belief
that principles of justice and equality require that all Americans should
have access to affordable healthcare. But it was also necessary to allocate a
responsible agent for these rights to materialize: the American public. The
goal of equal access to healthcare cannot be attained if uninsured
individuals are allowed to delay their entrance to the health insurance
market. Therefore, Congress implemented an individual obligation for the
realization of an important right: the right of all members of society to
equal access to healthcare. From this perspective, the Individual Mandate
can be viewed not as a necessary evil -financially necessary but
substantively unfortunate -but instead as a vital component of a scheme of
individual as well as governmental obligation to all members of society.
CONCLUSION
This moment offers an occasion to consider two founding myths of
legal origins: the Social Contract and Mount Sinai. Individual rights will
undoubtedly play a vital role as the Court and the public consider the fate
of the Individual Mandate. In particular, the Court will have to decide
between the liberty-based objection to the Individual Mandate and its
equality-based rationale. This decision can be enriched by a notion of
individual obligation. As Cover taught us, the recognition of a right can be
merely rhetorical if no one is directly responsible for its realization. A
society committed to equality may sometimes need to achieve its goals
through the recognition of an individual obligation of its members for the
minimal well-being of others. Alongside the individual rights to healthcare,
liberty, and equality, the public and judicial discussion of the Individual
Mandate should include the individual obligation to help others realize
those rights.

104. Cover, supra note 1, at 72 (internal citation omitted).
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